DYNAMICS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF FORMAL RULES AND PUBLIC SENTIMENTS: DEMONSTRATION FORMAL RULES VS MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC SENTIMENTS
Abstract
The article examines the consequences of the mutual influence of demonstrative formal rules and the manipulation of public sentiments for the dynamics of the effectiveness of existing formal rules. It was revealed that the immediate cause of the emergence and spread of both the practice of the implementation of demonstrative formal rules and the manipulation of public sentiments is excessive public anxiety. Both of these phenomena have a negative impact on the dynamics of the effectiveness of existing formal rules. It is shown that the demonstration formal rules are characterized by significant target inefficiency. The main consequences of the spread of the practice of the implementation of demonstration formal rules are a decrease in the effectiveness of the current formal rules and a decrease in the level of public concern about the corresponding problem. The latter, in the short term, reduces the danger of the emergence and spread of the practice of manipulating public sentiments around this issue. It has been established that in the long term, the main side effects of the practice of manipulating public sentiments are the conservation of previously accepted demonstrative formal rules and the suppression of the practice of the implementation of demonstrative formal rules. The impossibility of simultaneously spreading both the practice of the implementation of demonstrative formal rules and the practice of manipulating public sentiments has been proven. The spread of the practice of manipulating public sentiment becomes possible at a much higher level of public concern than the spread of the practice of the implementation of demonstrative formal rules. The latter phenomenon occurs long before the first signs of manipulation of public sentiment appear. It is shown that the only effective measure to prevent the spread of practices of the implementation of demonstrative formal rules and manipulating public attitudes is to increase the level of general education of society, which prevents the danger of artificially increasing the level of public sentiments and complicates the process of the implementation of ineffective formal rules.
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